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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Tracy appeals, contending that the State failed to demonstrate that the
officers' warrantless search of his home was justified by the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. In response, the State contends that "[Mr.] Tracy
has failed to demonstrate that law enforcement acted unreasonably in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution .... " (Resp. Br., p.11.)
Such a position improperly switches the burdens in regard to the warrant exception.
The State bears the burden to prove that the officers' action fell into one of the wellestablished and well-delineated exceptions, and if it fails to do so, the improperlydiscovered evidence should be suppressed.
The State's argument to that effect relies primarily on the fact that the officers
observed red marks on M.T. The State also argues that the officers did not need to
accept Ms. Tracy's assertion that there was nothing wrong in the house.

As to

Ms. Tracy's assertion, officers may justifiably disregard such statements only if there are
objective reasons to do so. The facts in this case, including the marks on M.T., do not
demonstrate that anyone in the house was in immediate danger or that there was some
other urgent reason to enter the home without a warrant - the officers had been
informed that Mr. Tracy had left the residence minutes before they arrived and all the
remaining residents were safely in the officers' field of view.

Therefore, there is no

objective reason to disregard Ms. Tracy's statement of assurance. This also means that
the State has failed to meet its burden to prove that an exception to the warrant
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requirement existed in this case.

As a result, this Court should reverse the district

court's erroneous decision to deny Mr. Tracy's motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Tracy's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Tracy's motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tracy's Motion To Suppress
A.

The State Misstated And Misapplied The Burden Of Proof In This Case, As It
Must Prove That The Officers' Actions Fell Within One Of The Exceptions To The
Warrant Requirement; Mr. Tracy Bears No Burden To Prove The Officers'
Actions Were Unreasonable
The State contends that, "[Mr.] Tracy has failed to demonstrate that law

enforcement acted unreasonably in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article
1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution by entering his home .... " (Resp. Br., p.11.) This
misstates, and inappropriately shifts, the relevant burden of proof. The United States
Supreme Court has made the proper burdens eminently clear:

"our past decisions

make clear that only in 'a few specifically established and well-delineated' situations
may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though
the authorities have probable cause to conduct it.

The burden rests on the State to

show the existence of such an exceptional situation." Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30,
34 (1970) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has subsequently explained:
Searches and seizures performed without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. To overcome the presumption, the State bears the burden
of establishing two prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a
'warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.' Second, the State must show that even if the seizure is
permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it 'must still be
reasonable in light of all the other surrounding circumstances.'

State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007) (quoting State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838
(2004 ), and Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002)) (emphasis added). Thus, if the
search was conducted without a warrant, the State must prove that an exception is
applicable to the facts at issue.

Mr. Tracy and other criminal defendants are not
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required to "demonstrate that law enforcement acted unreasonably in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution by entering his home"
because, by entering the home without the warrant, any such requirement has already
been satisfied. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (a unanimous
United States Supreme Court holding that warrantless searches "are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added).
In this case, the State has failed to meet its burden, as it has failed to
demonstrate that there was an exigent circumstance in this case that justified the
officers' warrantless entry into Mr. Tracy's home. Therefore, the evidence found therein
should be suppressed.

B.

The State Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Officers' Warrantless Entry Into
Mr. Tracy's Home Was Justified By Exigent Circumstances Because The Facts
Demonstrate There Was No Immediate Threat To Any Person In The Home
The State tries to justify the officers' entry into Mr. Tracy's home by relying on the

fact that there were red marks on M.T. and that the officers did not have to accept
Ms. Tracy's assurances that there was nothing wrong in the house. It is mistaken on
both points. First, the red marks on M.T. do not demonstrate that he was in immediate
danger, and therefore, there was no exigency created by the presence of such marks.
Second, the fact that Ms. Tracy told the officers that everything was fine may only be
disregarded if there are other facts reasonably demonstrating that an immediate threat
may still exist. As there were no such facts in this case, particularly given the fact that
officers had been informed minutes before arriving on scene that Mr. Tracy had left the

apartment, this fact does not demonstrate that there was an immediate danger to the
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people in the apartment, such that the officers were justified in warrantlessly entering
the apartment.
In regard to the red marks the officers saw on M.T., they did not create exigent
circumstances because they did not demonstrate an urgent or immediate reason for the
officers to enter the home.

The exigent circumstances exception only excuses the

warrant requirement "when there is 'compelling need for official action and no time to
secure a warrant."'

State v. Smith,

144 Idaho 482, 485-86 (2007) (quoting

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)) (emphasis added).

Thus, for this

exception to be applicable, the situation must demand urgent action by law
enforcement. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984); Smith, 144 Idaho at
486; State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2007).

However, the State

argues that, pursuant to State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 292 (2003), the officers'
observation of an injury after a reported altercation created a risk of danger to the
persons inside the home. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-11.)
Barrett is not so broad as the State believes because Barrett only authorizes
warrantless entries where the totality of the circumstances show there is an urgent or
immediate need to enter the house. The reason that urgent action by the officers was
necessary in that case, why there was no time to secure a warrant, was because upon
arriving, they "encountered Barrett in obvious distress, unable to stand, incoherent,
unable to hear, and noncommunicative." Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294. More specifically,
Barrett was incoherent and curled up in a fetal position. [Officer] Hosford
attempted to communicate with Barrett, but Barrett did not respond to any
of Hosford's inquiries, including his inquiry as to whether other persons
were in Barrett's house. Williams [a neighbor] told Hosford that Barrett's
wife, his two children, and sometimes others, lived with Barrett, and that
he had not seen Barrett's wife and children all day.
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Id. at 292 (emphasis added).

From these facts, the officer "could not determine the

nature and cause of the medical condition that had driven Barrett from his house to
seek help from neighbor Williams." Id. at 294 (emphasis added). Therefore, there was
an urgent need for officers to enter Mr. Barrett's home because "the police officers
legitimately believed, particularly in view of their inability to discern the cause of the
medical condition affecting Barrett, that the life of any occupants in Barrett's house may

very well have been at stake." Id. at 294-95 (emphasis added). Thus, the reason there
were exigent circumstances in Barrett is because officers knew that at least three other
people lived in the home, there was no indication that they had left the home, and there
was a potential medical emergency that could also have incapacitated them. See id.
Therefore, to ensure that those other people were not in immediate danger, the
warrantless entry was justified by the exigent circumstances. Id.
However, in situations where the other residents are accounted for, there is no
such exigency.

See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466 (Ct. App. 2008);

State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 1986). In Reynolds, officers responded to a

report of domestic disturbance, and when they arrived:
[they] saw Reynolds standing just outside the front door, which was ajar.
Two of the officers approached Reynolds and began to question him
about the reported altercation. In the meantime, a third officer, Officer
Harmon, entered the home through the partially-opened front door. He did
not hear any noises coming from the house, nor did he first knock,
announce his presence, or call for Melissa [the potential victim]. Upon
entering, Officer Harmon saw Melissa standing in the living room about
ten feet from the door.
Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 468-69. The Court of Appeals explained, "With the couple thus

separated, it was apparent that if there was a woman in the house, she was under no
immediate risk of harm from Reynolds while he was outside being questioned by an
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officer. Therefore, there was no exigency that would justify entry into the house without
first knocking or calling out to bring any occupant to the door where she could be
interviewed and the situation assessed." Id. at 471. The Court of Appeals specifically
contrasted that situation with Barrett on the very fact that there was no potential
"immediate danger that would justify dispensing with some effort to bring someone to

the door to be interviewed." Id. (emphasis from original). Therefore, Officer Harmon's
initial entry into the house was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement. Id.
The situation in this case is more similar to Reynolds than to Barrett.

Here,

Ms. Tracy answered the door and was, herself, in no obvious or immediate distress.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.32, L.21

p.33, L.4 (Officer Cox testifying that Ms. Tracy appeared "casual"

and not otherwise disconcerting).) The elder child that the officer could see from the
doorway also demonstrated no signs of obvious or immediate distress. (Tr., Vol.1, p.35,
Ls.5-7; Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.19-24.) Thus, only one potential victim was unaccounted for
during the officers' initial observations - M.T. However, Ms. Tracy offered to bring M.T.
down and show him to the officers. (Tr., Vol.1, p.35, Ls.8-13.) As noted above, this
was the proper form by which the officers should proceed, rather than entering without
some indication of immediate danger to the family members. See Reynolds, 146 Idaho
at 471.

Officer Cox testified that M.T. appeared to be calm and not in immediate

distress, despite the red lines on his body. (Tr., Vol.3, p.30, Ls.2-5; see also Tr., Vol.3,
p.36, Ls.12-14 (Officer Cox testifying that she did not call for medical assistance for
M.T.).)

Therefore, as there was no obvious immediate threat to any of the three

potential victims, compare Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 471, and since none were in obvious
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medical distress, compare Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294, this case is more like Reynolds
than Barrett. Thus, as in Reynolds, there was no exigency justifying the warrantless
entry into Mr. Tracy's home.
Similarly, this case is more similar to Rusho than Barrett, further demonstrating
why the State's reliance on Barrett is misplaced. In Rusho, Ms. Rusho left her house
and went to her neighbor's house because she feared an intruder was inside her house.
Rusho, 110 Idaho at 557.

One of the neighbors called the police while another walked through the
Rusho home, observing nothing unusual. Mrs. Rusho returned home
briefly, encountered no intruder, and walked back outside. Moments later,
a police officer arrived. He chatted momentarily with the neighbor and
entered the house without talking to Mrs. Rusho. He found nothing. While
he was still inside, a second officer arrived and began to search the
house. Mrs. Rusho ran to the porch where, according to her subsequent
testimony, she told the second officer, "Just forget it, there is nobody in
there, just forget it." This testimony was corroborated by a neighbor who
overheard the remark .... [T]he second officer proceeded into the house,
directing Mrs. Rusho to stay outside.
Id. at 557-58.

The Court of Appeals concluded that, while there had been an initial

exigency triggered by the call to police, by the time the second officer moved to enter
the house, "Mrs. Rusho and her children were outside the house, in no immediate
danger. The first officer, a neighbor and Mrs. Rusho herself had entered the house
without incident. ... In our view, the finding that an exigency still existed was clearly
erroneous. There was no compelling emergency." Id. at 560; compare Barrett, 138
Idaho at 294. The Court explained:
even though the possibility of an intruder had not been wholly eliminated,
we do not believe that such a bare possibility is sufficient to justify a
warrantless, nonconsensual search .... Fourth amendment values would
be gravely impaired if the mere report of an intruder became a license for
the police to enter a home and search it without a warrant, over the
homeowner's objection. A balance must be struck. We hold that such
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warrantless and nonconsensual searches are permissible only if there is
probable cause to believe that an intruder exists and it reasonably
appears that persons or property are in immediate danger.
Rusho, 110 Idaho at 560 (emphasis added); compare Barrett 138 Idaho at 294 (holding

that, where it reasonably appeared that people inside were still in immediate danger, the
warrantless entry was appropriate).
In this case, as in Rusho, and according to the officers' own testimony, the
mother and children were both accounted for and not in any apparent immediate danger
or obvious distress. Therefore, this case is more like Rusho than Barrett, and thus, as
in Rusho, there was no exigency justifying the warrantless entry into Mr. Tracy's home.
Thus, the State's reliance on Barrett is misplaced. This is not a situation where one
person was in obvious medical distress and thus, unable to dispel the officers'
concerns.

Since, in this case, the facts known to the officers at the time of the

warrantless entry into the house demonstrate that there was no immediate danger, 1 the
State has failed to demonstrate that this exception to the warrant requirement justifies
the officers' presumptively unreasonable warrantless entry into the Tracys' house.
In regard to Ms. Tracy's assurances that everything was fine, the State is correct
that officers do not necessarily have to believe such assurances. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)
However, that simple position does not give effect to the full rule. The full rule allows

While the mere possibility that Mr. Tracy had returned to the home existed, that hunch
was insufficient to justify the officers' warrantless entry over Ms. Tracy's objections.
Compare Rusho, 110 Idaho at 560. In fact, the idea that he had returned to the home in
this case is particularly unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances, since
officers had confirmed with an independent witness that Mr. Tracy had left the home
mere minutes before they arrived. (Tr., Vol.3, p.41, Ls.14-17.) That evidence means
the possibility of an intruder posing an immediate threat was even less likely than in
Rusho. Thus, that factor was even less likely to give rise to an exigency in this case
than it was in Rusho.
1
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officers to not accept such statements when there are objective facts which justify the
officers in their disbelief of the statement. For example, where the person answering
the door was bloodied and officers could hear sounds of an ongoing argument, their
disregard of the person's assurance that all was well was justified. State v. Sailas, 129
Idaho 432, 434-35 (Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, where officers arrived and observed the
defendant and the victim wrestling on the floor, their disregard of the victim's
assurances was justified. State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 850 (Ct. App.
2001 ).

In that same regard, where officer observed an obviously-fresh injury, when

combined with the fact that victim was visibly upset, their disbelief of her statement of
assurance was justified. State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 16-17 (2001 ).
There were no such facts present in this case which would justify the officers'
disbelief of Ms. Tracy's statements of assurance.

Unlike in Wiedenheft, neither

Ms. Tracy nor her children were visibly upset; rather, they all appeared calm and casual.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.32, L.21 - p.33, L.4 (Officer Cox testifying that Ms. Tracy's appearance
was casual and not otherwise disconcerting); Tr., Vol.1, p.35, Ls.5-7 (Officer Cox
testifying that she observed nothing disconcerting about the elder child who was
immediately visible from the doorway); Tr., Vol.3, p.30, Ls.2-5 (Officer Cox testifying that
M.T. appeared calm and was not crying).) Unlike in Sai/as or Pearson-Anderson, the
officers did not see any ongoing fight, nor did they hear any ongoing arguments.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.34, Ls.14-21; Tr., Vol.3, p.20, L.15 - p.21, L.1.) Therefore, without some
fact justifying their disbelief of Ms. Tracy's statement of assurance, that statement is a
factor which further demonstrates that there was no exigency in this case. As a result,
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that statement further demonstrates that the officers' warrantless entry in to the house
was not justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.
As such, the facts present in this case demonstrate that there was no immediate
threat or other urgent need for the officers to enter Mr. Tracy's house, and thus, the
State has failed to meet its burden and prove that exception to the warrant requirement
justifies the officers' unreasonable, warrantless entry into that house.

Because the

State did not meet its burden in that regard, the evidence found during that illegal
search should be suppressed.

Thus, the district court's order denying Mr. Tracy's

motion to suppress that evidence should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tracy respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress the evidence found during the officers' warrantless
search of the apartment and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 4 th day of April, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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